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PRODUCTS LIABILITY-
THE MEANING OF DEFECT
DAvID.A. FIsCmR*
I. INTRODUCION
The early English law held persons causing harm strictly accountable
without a showing of fault.1 This approach was continued when the civil
action for compensatory damages developed.2 With the advent of industrial
machinery in the 17th century, the requirement of fault began creeping
into the law.3 A fault system was necessary in order to encourage industrial
development and travel.4 The fault system of liability became fully devel-
oped in the latter part of the 19th century.5 Even when fault was clearly
present, courts tended to go to extremes to exculpate defendants by the
use of various arbitrary immunities and elaborate defenses.6
In the products liability area the pendulum has now swung back to
the imposition of strict liability. This transition, beginning with the elimina-
tion of the privity requirement in negligence actions, continuing with the
imposition of strict liability under a warranty theory, and culminating in
the development of a tort theory of recovery in strict liability, has been
well-documented. 7 The following policy considerations favoring the imposi-
tion of strict liability are said to have motivated the transition:
1. Risk Spreading. The manufacturer should spread losses resulting from
the use of his products among all consumers by raising the price of the
product enough to pay for resulting losses or purchasing insurance against
those losses.8
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia; B.A. 1965, J.D.
1968 Missouri-Columbia.
1. Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARv. L. REv. 97 (1908); Isaacs, Fault and
Liability, 81 HAzv. L. RPv. 954 (1918); Malone, Ruminations on the Role of
Fault in the History of the Common Law of Torts, 31 LA. L. REv. 1 (1970); Wig-
more, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARv. L. REv. 315, 883,
441 (1894).
2. Malone, note 1 supra; Woodbine, The Origins of the Action of Trespass,
83 YALE L.J. 799 (1924).
3. Malone, note 1 supra; Priehard, Trespass, Case and the rule in Williams
v. Holland, [1964] CAvm. L. REv. 284.
4. Malone, note 1 supra.
5. Ames, note 1 supra; Malone, note 1 supra.
6. Malone, note 1 supra.
7. E.g., Krauskopf, Products Liability, 82 Mo. L. REv. 459 (1967); Prosser,
The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J.
1099, 1103-14 (1960); Reitz and Seabolt, Warranties and Product Liability:
Who Can Sue and Where?, 46 TEmx. L.Q. 527 (1978).
8. Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for Product Design and Manu-facture, 52 TEXAS L. REv. 81, 82-84, 87-88 (1978); Keeton, Product Liability
(339)
HeinOnline  -- 39 Mo. L. Rev. 339 1974
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
2. Safety Incentive. Risk spreading increases costs. Competition on the
other hand, forces the manufacturer to keep costs down. This provides an
incentive to develop safer products.9
3. Frustration of Consumer Expectations. Consumers should be pro-
tected from dangers of which they are not aware.'0
4. Proof Problems. Defective products usually result from fault, but the
complexities of the modem manufacturing process make this very difficult
to prove. This problem is circumvented by simply imposing strict liability."
Strict liability does not make the manufacturer an insurer that no harm
will arise from the use of his product.'2 For example, the manufacturer of
a properly made axe should not be held liable to everyone who is cut by it.
Liability must be limited in some way, but as yet these limits are uncer-
tain.13 A primary method of limiting liability has been by requiring the
product to be "defective."' 4 In defining the term "defect," a distinction is
commonly made between harm produced by manufacturing defects (a
miscarriage in the manufacturing process produces an unintended condi-
tion) and harm produced by a product that is unavoidably unsafe.' 5 The
enormously influential Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A' 6 in-
corporates this distinction by virtue of the way it defines "defect."17 Under
the Restatement, strict liability is imposed for harm caused by latent manu-
facturing defects.' 8 But for harm caused by unavoidably unsafe products,
liability is imposed only upon a showing of fault, either in negligently adopt-
ing an unsafe design or in negligently failing to give a proper warning. 19
While this distinction has been generally followed,20 a number of recent
and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MuY's L.J. 30, 34-35 (1973); Wade, On the
Nature of Strict Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 826 (1973).
9. Holford, note 8 supra; Wade, note 8 supra.
10. Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good does a Product Have to Be?,
42 IND. L.J. 802, 305, 312 (1967); Keeton, supra note 8; Rheingold, What Are
the Consumers "Reasonable Expectations"?, 22 Bus. LAwYER 589, 597-98 (1967).
11. Keeton, note 8 supra; Wade, note 8 supra.
12. E.g., Holford, note 8 supra; Calabresi and Hirschoff, Toward A Test for
Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972); Note, Products Liability-
Under Greenman Formulation the Plaintiff need not prove that the Defective
Product was unreasonably dangerous, 23 DRAan L. RlEv. 197 (1973); Note,
Products Liability-New lersey Court Eliminates "Unreasonably Dangerous"
Requirement in Strict Tort Liability Action, 5 SEToN HIALL L. trv. 152 (1973).
13. Calabresi and Hirschoff, note 12 supra; Holford, note 8 supra; Keeton,
Product Liability and the Automobile, 9 FoRUM 1 (1973); Keeton, note 8 supra.
14. See, e.g., Note, 23 DRAYE L. REv., note 12 supra; Note, 5 SETON HALL L.
REv., note 12 supra.
15. See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 8 at 33; Note, 23 DnAKE L. REv., note 12
supra; Note, 5 SEToN HALL L. RE.v., note 12 supra.
16. Hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT.
17. See pt. II of this article.
18. See pt. II, § A of this article.
19. See pt. II, § B of this article.
20. E.g., Balido v. Improved Mach. Co., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr.
890 (1973); Oakes v. Geigy Agricultural Chems., 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 709 (1969); Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. App.
1973).
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cases have repudiated the Restatement definition of defect.21 Also, an
increasing number of cases are imposing strict liability for harm caused by
unavoidably unsafe products22 and patently dangerous products. 23 These
cases present interesting theoretical problems. By rejecting traditional defi-
nitions of "defect" and substituting no new definition, no basis is left for
determining when to impose absolute liability and when to exonerate the
manufacturer. Some basis for distinction is necessary if the axe manufacturer
mentioned above is to escape liability to everyone cut by an axe.
If the requirement of the "defect" is to be used as a method of restrict-
ing the scope of strict liability, the term should be defined in the manner
most effectively advancing the policy considerations underlying the adop-
tion of strict liability. These policy factors are not always consistent. In the
various fact patterns that arise, some of the factors may point toward the
imposition of strict liability while others do not. Therefore, the particular
objectives that a court desires to achieve should influence its definition of
"defect." No single narrow definition of defect will work well in all situa-
tions.24 For example, comment c of the Restatement indicates that risk
spreading is a primary justification for strict liability. This policy can point
as strongly in the direction of strict liability in cases involving unavoidably
unsafe products as in manufacturing defect cases. Yet the Restatement defi-
nition of defect does not advance this policy in unavoidably unsafe products
cases unless there is a showing of fault.25 In some, like the axe case mentioned
above, imposition of strict liability is undesirable. This, however, is not
true of all such cases.2 6
This article will first discuss the traditional definition of defect. Cases
rejecting that approach will then be analyzed. Finally, a different approach
to determining "defectiveness" will be discussed.
II. TimMEANING OF "Dsxcr" UNDER BEm RESTATmENT
The Restatement proposes the following rule of strict liability:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm
to User or Consumer
21. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433 (1972); Class v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562(1973). See also Anderson v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 858 F. Supp. 976 (D. Alaska
1973) (dictum).
22. See pt. III, § C of this article.
23. Cases cited notes 103-05 infra.
24. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict
Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 367 (1965). See also Keeton, Products Liability
-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TE.XAs L. REv.
855, 859 (1963); Comment, Strict Liability in Tort Based on Defective Design,
1970 WAsH. U.L.Q. 359, 364-65.
25. Note, Products Liability and Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts,
55 CEo. L.J. 286, 322 (1966).
26. See pts. III, § C and V of this article.
1974]
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(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepara-
tion and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
This provision and the comments which follow establish a bifurcated
test of defectiveness. A product is defective if, at the time it leaves the
seller's hands, it is in a condition (1) not contemplated by the ultimate
consumer, which will be (2) unreasonably dangerous to him.27 The first
aspect of the test prevents frustration of consumer expectations. Recovery
is precluded, however, if the dangerous aspect of the product is generally
known,28 has been adequately warned against,29 or is obvious.30 Such dan-
gers do not frustrate consumer expectations since the consumer knows of
them. An objective test is used to determine whether a particular danger is
unexpected.31 This test is evaluated in Part Il, section B of this article.
The second aspect of the test imposes the additional requirement that
the product be in a condition which is unreasonably dangerous. Clocks that
do not keep time or paints that fade prematurely may be defective but pose
no threat of physical harm to person or property. Since the Restatement
limits liability to such harm,32 it makes sense to require that the defective
condition be dangerous. Whether a condition is unreasonably dangerous,
however, may depend on whether the case involves a manufacturing defect
or an unavoidably unsafe product.
27. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, comment g.
28. Id., comment i.
29. Id., comments h and j.
30. The Restatement does not address itself to this question, but it is com-
monly held that under the Restatement a warning is not required if the danger is
obvious. E.g., Maas v. Dreher, 10 Ariz. App. 520, 460 P.2d 191 (1970); Denton
v. Bachtold Brothers, Inc., 8 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 291 N.E.2d 229 (1972). See
Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw.
L.J. 256, 274 (1969).
31. Maas v. Dreher, 10 Ariz. App. 520, 460 P.2d 191 (1970). The RiEsTATr-
mE.NT, note 16 supra, comment i at 352, provides that: "[t]he article sold must be
dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the com-
munity as to its characteristics." The contributory fault defense described in com-
ment n of the Restatement is distinguishable from this definition of defect because
it requires subjective knowledge of the danger.
32. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, subsection (1).
[Vol. 39
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A. Manufacturing Defects
A manufacturing defect is a miscarriage in the manufacturing process
which produces an unintended result. Although the Restatement requires
that the defective condition be "unreasonably dangerous," negligence is
not a prerequisite to liability. A manufacturer can be held liable even
though he has "exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product."3 3 Excusable ignorance of the presence of a defect is no defense.
Thus there is no requirement of a culpable mental state.34 The requirement
that the danger be "unreasonable" is said to prevent the imposition of
liability where the utility of placing the defective product on the market
outweighs the gravity of the harm threatened by the condition.35
B. Unavoidably Unsafe Products
Since the Restatement imposes liability only for products "in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous"36 it can be argued that, where manu-
facturing defects are concerned, the product must contain a physical imper-
fection and the imperfection must create an unreasonable danger.37 Where
the product is unavoidably unsafe, however, there usually38 is no physical
imperfection. The product is exactly as the manufacturer intended it. In
this situation "defecf" does not imply a physical imperfection; the only
question is whether the product is unreasonably dangerous. 39
The term "unreasonably dangerous" has a different meaning here than
it does for manufacturing defects. Comment k to the Restatement excepts
from strict liability "unavoidably unsafe products," i.e. products that "in
the present state of human knowledge" are incapable of being made safe
for use.40 Such products are not "defective" or "unreasonably dangerous"
if marketing them is justified because their utility outweighs the risk their
33. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, subsection (2) (a).
34. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 15-16
(1965).
85. Dickerson, supra note 10, at 320; Wade, supra note 34 at 14-17; Note,
55 GEO. L.J., supra note 25 at 297. See Caputzal v. The Lindsay Co., 48 N.J. 69,
222 A.2d 513 (1966), where a defective water softener caused discoloration of
water. After consuming coffee made from this water, plaintiff suffered a heart
attack when he later saw the color of the water. The Court declined to hold the
defendant liable for such an unlikely result. This test is evaluated in text accom-
panying notes 62-68 infra.
36. Restatement, supra note 16, subsection (1).
87. Wade, supra note 34 at 14; Note, 55 CEo. L.J., supra note 25 at 297.
38. Some unavoidably unsafe products are imperfect in the sense that they
contain an impurity which is scientifically impossible to eliminate. See note 107
infra.
39. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.
1973); Keeton, supra note 13 at 5; Keeton, supra note 8 at 32; Wade, supra note
8 at 831; Wade, supra note 34 at 15; Note, 55 CEo. L.J. supra note 25 at 297.
40. REsTATEMNT, supra note 16, comment k.
1974]
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use involves.41 Such products must be "properly prepared and marketed,
and a proper warning given."42 Failure to give a proper warning makes the
product unreasonably dangerous.43 A proper warning is required if the seller
"has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human
skill and foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient
and the danger."44 This, in effect, imposes strict liability for the consequences
of a failure to warn only when the seller is negligent.4 5 The propriety of a
product's design is likewise a question of negligence.40 By providing that
an unavoidably unsafe product is neither defective nor unreasonably dan-
gerous if it is as safe as the present state of human knowledge can make it,47
the Restatement has re-introduced the requirement of a culpable mental
state. This is the same mental state required by the law of negligence.
Manufacturers are required to keep up with scientific advances by that
law as well.48
Comment i of the Restatement discusses the "unreasonably dangerous"
requirement. To be unreasonably dangerous: "[the article sold must be
dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common
to the community as to its characteristics." This reiterates the consumer
expectations aspect of the bifurcated test given in comment g. This sentence
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, comment I.
44. Id.
45. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.
1973); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); Skaggs
v. Clairol Inc., 6 Cal. App. 3d 1, 85 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1970); Oakes v. Geigy
Agricultural Chemicals, 272 Cal. App. 2d 645; 77 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1969); W.
Pnossan, HANDBOO OF TH LAW OF TORTS, 644, 646, 659 (4th ed. 1971) (this
author was the reporter to the Restatement when section 402A was adopted);
Kissel, Defenses to Strict Liability, 60 ILL. B.J. 450, 462-64 (1972); Note, 55
GEo. L.J., supra note 25 at 317-18. See also Keeton, Products Liability-Drugs
and Cosmetics, 25 VA'D. L. REv. 131, 139 (1972); Rheingold, Proof of Defect
in Product Liability Cases, 38 Tm.i. L. REv. 325 (1971); Wade, supra note 8 at
886; Comment, Foreseeability in Product Design and Duty to Warn Cases-
Distinctions and Misconceptions, 1968 Wis. L. Rav. 228.
46. Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr.
890 (1973); Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. App. 1973);
PnossER, supra note 45 at 644, 659; Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in
Technology Assessment, 38 U. CN. L. REv. 587 (1969); Kissel, note 45 supra;
Traynor, note 24 supra; Note, 55 GEo. L.J., supra note 25 at 317-18; Note, Torts-
Strict Liability-Automobile Manufacturer Liable for Defective Design that
Enhanced Injury After Initial Accident, 24 Vin. L. REv. 862, 866 (1971). See
also Boisfontaine, Products Liability-An Overview, 20 LA. B.J. 269 (1973);
Rheingold, note 45 supra; Wade, supra note 8 at 836; Comment, 1968 Wis. L.
REv., note 45 supra.
47. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, comment k.
48. Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964) (Missouri law);
Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240 N.W.
392 (1932).
[Vol. 39
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is sometimes wrongly singled out as the only Restatement test of defect.49
The Restatement and its comments must be read as a whole. The quoted
statement was made while discussing certain unavoidably unsafe products
whose dangers are commonly known. Although the statement is accurate
with respect to such products,50 it does not follow that the statement will
be true in all instances where the danger is not generally known or obvious.
Assume the risk of harm from a new, useful product is not scientifically
known when the product is first marketed. Comment k implies that there
is no liability because the danger was not known,51 and comment j pre-
cludes liability for failure to warn for the same reason. This is a situation
where only one aspect of the bifurcated test of defectiveness is met, i.e.,
consumer expectations are frustrated because of an unexpected hazard, but
the hazard did not make the product unreasonably dangerous because its
use was justified under the circumstances. Liability would not be imposed
because both aspects of the bifurcated test must be satisfied.5 2
C. Problems Posed by Restatement Definition of Defect
In the case of unavoidably unsafe products the Restatement requires
negligence as a prerequisite for the imposition of strict liability. This inherent
contradiction in terms creates a number of difficult problems. First, instruct-
ing the jury is very difficult,53 especially in view of the common practice of
bringing such cases on alternative theories of negligence, strict liability, and
breach of warranty.54 The essence of the action is negligence in such cases."5
49. E.g., Lunt v. Brody Mfg. Corp., 13 Ariz. App. 805, 475 P.2d 964 (1970).
50. The statement is also literally true of an unavoidably unsafe product
whose dangers are known or knowable by the manufacturer but are not generally
known and are not obvious. Here, a negligent failure to warn makes the product
defective. RESTATFmENT, supra note 16, comments h and j. If a proper warning is
giyen, the product is rendered non-defective because knowledge is imputed to
the consumer. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16 comment j.
51. A product qualifies under the comment k exception if it is incapable of
being made safe in the present state of human knowledge, it is properly pre-
pared, and its use is apparently justified. One cannot guard against an unknown
risk. The inability to make the product safe is therefore excused. The comment
expressly applies to "new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of
time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance
of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there
is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recog-
nizable risk." (Emphasis Added). Saying that there can be no assurance of safety
or even purity of ingredients is another way of saying that the hazards inherent
in the product are unknown. See, Note, 55 GEo. L.J., supra note 25 at 317-18.
52. Another situation where the comment i test fails is where a patient is not
informed of a risk for medical reasons. Presumably the manufacturer would escape
liability if his product is unavoidably unsafe. See Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc.,
296 F. Supp. 776, 783 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Dickerson, supra note 10 at 326; James,
The Untoward Effects of Cigarettes and Drugs: Some Reflections On Enterprise
Liability, 54 GAL. L. REv. 1550, 1554 (1966).
53. Wade, supra note 8 at 832.
54. E.g., Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 890 (1973).
55. See note 79 infra.
1974]
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Instructing the jury under three different word formulations can only lead
to confusion. It is far better to simply instruct on negligence. 6
Second, the Restatement 57 provides that the plaintiff's contributory
negligence in failing to discover a defect or to guard against the possibility
of its existence is not a defense because the liability imposed upon the seller
is strict. However, negligence is required to impose strict liability for prod-
ucts that are alleged to be unavoidably unsafe. Thus, the Restatement
eliminates a traditional negligence defense to what is essentially a negligence
action. 8 No policy reason is advanced to justify this.
III. ALTRNATiVE_ To Tm REsTATEmENT DEFINTION OF DF-Ecr
A. Cases Eliminating The "Unreasonably Dangerous" Requirement
Courts in two of the most influential products liability jurisdictions
have rejected the "unreasonably dangerous" criteria for defectiveness. In
Cronin v. I. B. E. Olson Corp.,5m the California Supreme Court did so in a
case involving a manufacturing defect.60 The court held that a manufacturer
is subject to strict liability in tort if the plaintiff proves that: the manu-
facturer placed an article on the market knowing that it would be used
without inspection for defects; the article was defective; and the defect
caused injury to a human being.61
In manufacturing defect cases, the Cronin rule would impose liability
even when a reasonable man with full knowledge of the existence of the
flaw would place the product on the market because the gravity of the
harm threatened is minor compared to the utility of the product.0 2 The
unreasonably dangerous test, applied to the same circumstances, would
preclude liability.6 This test is said to be desirable because it prevents the
imposition of liability for sand in a restaurant salad, the salad being defective
but not unreasonably dangerous to health.6 4 Even assuming this to be true,
56. Skaggs v. Clairol Inc., 6 Cal. App. 3d 1, 85 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1970);
Oakes v. Geigy Agricultural Chemicals, 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 77 Cal. Rptr. 709(1969); Kissel, supra note 45 at 464.
57. RETATEMENT, supra note 16, comment n.
58. Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1973); Keeton,
supra note 45 at 137.
59. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
60. Id. Plaintiff was involved in an accident while driving his bread truck.
A flawed aluminum safety hasp, designed to hold the bread trays in place, gave
way and permitted the trays to move forward and hurl the plaintiff throughthe windshield.
61. 8 Cal. 8d at 130, 501 P.2d at 1159, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 439; Luque v.
McLean, 8 Cal. 8d 186, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
62. See discussion of Restatement test at notes 32-35 supra. The facts in
Cronin clearly do not qualify for this exemption from strict liability.
63. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
64. Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a Product Have to BeP,
42 IND. L.J. 301, 304 n.12 (1967).
[Vol. 39
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why should the restaurant be exempt from strict liability? While it is
unlikely that a few grains of sand 5 could harm the consumer,66 in the event
that such harm does occur there is a loss to be borne by either the customer
or the restaurant. Cronin indicated that risk spreading is an important
justification for strict liability.67 Consideration should be given to advancing
that policy.68 The safety incentive rationale could be advanced here as strict
liability would induce the restaurant to take future precautions against
sand getting into food.
Cronin raises a number of difficult questions in cases where unavoid-
ably- unsafe products are involved. Under the Restatement formulation the
term "defect" normally has no independent meaning in such cases.69 The
"unreasonably dangerous" requirement prevents the manufacturer from
being an insurer by requiring negligence as a prerequisite to the imposition
of liability. Thus, the manufacturer of a carefully made axe is not strictly
liable to everyone who is cut by the axe since the state of the art prevents
him from producing a safer product, and the marketing of axes is justified
in view of their utility.70 Cronin expressly extended its rule eliminating the
"unreasonably dangerous" requirement to cases involving alleged design
defects. Although not mentioned by the court, this was logically necessary
in view of the California cases imposing strict liability on producers of
unavoidably unsafe products. 71 Thus, California had already eliminated
the negligence requirement in a limited number of such cases. Cronin
recognized the usefulness of the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement as
a method of preventing the manufacturer from always being held as an
insurer.72 However, it provided no substitute criteria for deciding when
to exonerate the manufacturer. The court will have to formulate such
criteria in the future.
In Glass v. Ford Motor Co.,73 a New Jersey Superior Court also elimi-
nated the requirement. It is not clear whether the case involved a manu-
65. I assume the example refers to a salad containing a small amount of
sand. If there is enough sand in the salad that its presence is obvious, then the
product is not defective under the Restatement formulation because it does not
violate consumer expectations. See note 30 supra. Note that the salad case is an
example of a manufacturing defect since it is technologically possible to produce
a sand-free salad.
66. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, subsection (1) permits recovery only for
physical harm.
67. 8 Cal. 3d at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
68. More information is needed to determine whether risk spreading istustifiable. The seriousness Qf the loss is an important factor. Another factor to
e considered is the effect on the restaurant. See pt. V of this article.
69. See text accompanying note 38-39 supra.
70. See pt. 11, § B of this article.
71. See pt. HI, § C of this article.
72. 8 Cal. 3d at 132, 501 P.2d at 1161-62; 104 Cal. Rptr. at 441-42.
73. 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (1973). See also Anderson v. Fair.
child Hiller Corp., 358 F. Supp. 976, 978 (D. Alaska 1973) (dictum).
1974]
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facturing defect or an unavoidably unsafe product. The court had also
previously imposed strict liability for the marketing of unavoidably unsafe
products under certain conditions.74
The Restatement imposes a bifurcated test for determining defective-
ness. 7 If the "unreasonably dangerous" test is eliminated, the "consumer
expectations" test remains. This test is discussed in the next section.
B. "Consumer Expectation" as the Sole Test of Defectiveness
Many courts have used consumer expectations as a criteria for defining
defect.70 If a consumer reasonably expects a product to be safe to use for
a purpose, the product is defective if it does not meet those expectations.
The consumer expectations test is natural since strict liability in tort devel-
oped from the law of warranty.77 The law of implied warranty is vitally
concerned with protecting justified expectations since this is a fundamental
policy of the law of contracts.78 The liabilty imposed under the Restatement
for physical harm is the same as would be imposed under implied warranty
except that contractual defenses such as disclaimer, lack of privity, and lack
of notice are not recognized.79 Therefore, cases involving products alleged
74. See pt. III, § C of this article.
75. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
76. E.g., Lunt v. Brady Mfg. Corp., 13 Ariz. App. 305, 475 P.2d 964(1970); Dunham v. Vaughan & Gusnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 399, 247 N.E.2d
401 (1969).
77. Articles cited note 7 supra; Keeton, Product Liability and the Automobile,
9 Fontum 1, 8 (1973).
78. See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J.
825, 833-34 (1973). This criterion is especially well suited for commercial losses.
Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965);
Keeton, supra note 77 at 7; Wade supra note 78 at 829; Wade, Strict Tort Liability
of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 6 (1965). Under the law of warranty, recovery
for physical harm is permitted only as consequential damages. Keeton, supra note
77 at 7; Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J.
30, 37 (1978); Wade, supra note 78 at 829, 833; Wade, 19 Sw. L.J. at 6.
79. E.g., Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362, 364 (Mo.
1969); Krauskopf, Products Liability, 82 Mo. L. REv. 459, 469 (1967); Reitz and
Seabolt, Warranties and Product Liability: Who Can Sue and Where?, 46 T.mP.
L.Q. 527 (1973); Rheingold, What Are the Consumers "Reasonable Expecta-
tions?," 22 Bus. LAVw.ER 589, 589-91 (1967). The implied warranty of mer-
chantability requires goods to be "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such
goods are used." U ,om CommERcrAL Coi)E § 2-314 (c). This has been
interpreted to require "reasonable fitness" only. Keeton, supra note 77 at 7;
Rheingold, supra note 10 at 590 n.4; Note, The Automobile Manufacurer'sLiability to Pedestrians for Exterior Design: New Dimensions in "Crash-
worthiness," 71 Mrion. L. R~v. 1654, 1670-71 (1973). Thus, the implied warrantydefinition of defect is the converse of the Restatement definition. Note, The Con-
cept of Defective Condition: A Tale of udicial Re-Tailoring, 39 U.M.K.C. L.
REv. n60, 263-64 (1970). The Restatement sets a standard of non-compiance (un-
reasonably dangerous) whereas implied warranty law sets a standard of compliance(reasonably fit). Dickerson, supra note 64 at 304. The result is that under the
la t of implied warranty there is no liability for marketing unavoidably unsafe
products unless negligence can be shown. Hays v. Western Auto Supply Co., 405
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to be unavoidably unsafe, and thus requiring proof of negligence in design,
are also subject to the rule that consumer expectations must be frustrated,
i.e., the danger must be hidden. 0
The consumer expectations test of defectiveness works quite well in
many situations. For example, suppose the user of a sharp knife cut himself.
The test bars liability because the danger is generally known and obvious.81
The result is just. The test affords some protection to the plaintiff. Because
he knows of the danger, he can use the product in such a way as to minimize
the risk.82 The industry cannot eliminate the danger without destroying the
utility of the product,83 and the losses would be too great to bear.
The consumer expection criteria can be the exclusive test used to resolve
both manufacturing defect cases and cases involving unavoidably unsafe
products.8 4 Serious problems develop, however, if consumer expectations are
used as the exclusive test of defectiveness.8 5 Expectations as to safety will
not always be in line with what the reasonable manufacturer can achieve
because the average consumer will not have the same information as experts
S.W.2d 877 (Mo. 1966) (failure to equip lawnmower with guard did not breach
implied warranty because the need for it was not reasonably foreseeable). This
is even true where the risk posed by the unavoidably unsafe product was not
scientifically known when it was placed on the market. Ross v. Philip Morris &
Co., 828 F.2d 8 (8th Cir. 1964) (applying Missouri law; no breach of implied
warranty for sale of cigarettes causing cancer before the risk was scientifically
known). Consumer expectations are very likely to be frustrated when the risk of
harm is unknown. Since the test of defect is the same under the traditional applica-
tion of either theory, departures from this approach by cases applying warranty
law are as significant as strict liability cases departing from the traditional
approach.
80. Keeton, Product Liability and the Automobile, 9 FORUM 1, 11 (1978);
Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture
and Design of Products, 20 SY cums L. Rnv. 559, 572 (1969). See pt. II of
this article for a discussion of the bifurcated test of defectiveness used by the
Restatement.
81. Authorities cited in note 80 supra.
82. Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 881 F. Supp. 758 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d
1889 (3d Cir. 1978); Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48
TExAs L. lRv. 898, 400 (1970); James, The Untoward Effects of Cigarettes and
Drugs: Some Reflections on Enterprise Liability, 15 CAL. L. Rxv. 1550, 1555,
1557 (1966).
88. Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 881 F. Supp. 758 (E.D. Pa. 1971), affd, 474
F.2d 1889 (3d Cir. 1978).
84. Manufacturing defects: Maas v. Dreher, 10 Ariz. App. 520, 460 P.2d 191(1970).
Unavoidably unsafe products: Lunt v. Brady Mfg. Corp., 18 Ariz. App. 805,
475 P.2d 964 (1970); Morrow v. Trailmobile, 12 Ariz. App. 578, 478 P.2d 780(1970); Wagner v. Coronet Hotel, 10 Ariz. App. 296, 458 P.2d 890 (1969); See
Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 470 P.2d 185 (Nev. 1970). Under this approach
courts can avoid evaluating the reasonableness of conscious design choices. Hen-
derson, judicial Review of Manufacturer's Conscious Design Choies: The Limits
of Adiudication, 78 COL. L. REv. 1581 (1978). Some writers have contended that
courts are not equipped to do this. Id. at 1557-58; Pawlak, Manufacturer's Design
Liability: The Expanding Frontiers of the Law, 19 DErENSE L.J. 148, 171 (1970).
85. Cases using this approach are cited in note 84 supra.
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in the field. Consumer expectations may be too high or too low. In addition,
once expectations become settled in a manner consistent with present prac-
tice, manufacturers will have no incentive to improve the safety of products 6
even when this is feasible.87 This frustrates a major policy underlying strict
liability.88
With new and unfamiliar products, expectations as to safety tend to be
high.89 Assume a new product is introduced which possesses a scientifically
unknown danger. Since consumer expectations are frustrated, strict liability
is imposed.90 While imposition of liability advances the risk spreading justi-
fication for strict liability from the point of view of the consumer, it may
also impose a hardship on the manufacturer because he cannot plan to
spread a risk of which he is unaware.91 Development of new products might
therefore be discouraged by the spectre of such liability.92
Suppose in the example mentioned above the product is unavoidably
unsafe, and one year after its introduction the danger becomes commonly
known. Because the product is no longer defective after the risk becomes
expected, 3 a consumer injured in the second year has no remedy. If the
knowledge of the risk permits him to protect himself from the hazard, his
case is distinguishable from that of a consumer who recovered in strict
liability before the risk became known. But suppose he cannot protect
himself. Assume there are no defensive measures which permit the use of the
product without a risk of harm,94 and the consumer is compelled to use the
product to avert a serious and more eminent harm to himself. 5 Here, per-
86. Dickerson, supra note 64 at 314; Wade, supra note 78 at 884 n.8.
87. Royal v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So.2d 807 (Fla. App. 1968);
Denton v. Bachtold Bros., Inc., 8 Ill. App. 8d 1088, 291 N.E.2d 229 (1972);
Murphy v. Cory Pump & Supply Co., 47 Ill. App. 2d 882, 197 N.E.2d 849 (1964).
A literal application of the consumer expectation test would also bar recovery for
correctable latent defects when a warning has been given. The possibility of such
a result has been condemned. Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate
Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256, 262 (1969); Traynor, supra note 24
at 872; Note, Products Liability and Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts,
55 GEo. L.J. 286, 806-07 (1966).
88. In Palmer v. Massey-Ferg. on, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 517, 476 P.2d
718, 719 (1970), the court said '[t]he manufacturer of the obviously defective
product ought not to escape because the product was obviously a bad one. The
law, we think, out to discourage misdesign rather than encouraging it in its
obvious form."
89. Rheingold, What Are the Consumers "Reasonable Expectations.?, 22
Bus. LAWYn 589, 595 (1967).
90. Lunt v. Brady Mfg. Corp., 18 Ariz. App. 805, 475 P.2d 964 (1970);
Wagner v. Coronet Hotel, 10 Ariz. App. 296, 458 P.2d 890 (1969).
91. Connolly, The Liability of a Manufacturer for Unknowable Hazards
Inherent in His Product, 32 INs. C.J. 803, 807 (1965). But see discussion of this
at notes 167-170 infra.
92. But see discussion of this at notes 177-180 infra.
98. Note, 55 GEo. L.J., supra note 87 at 818.
94. James, supra note 82 at 1555. This problem is discussed in pts. III, §C
and V of this article.
95. An employee required to use an obviously dangerous piece of equipment
may have no effective choice if he cannot afford to quit his job. Brown v. Quick
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mitting the first user to recover and denying recovery to the second is arbi-
trary. The obviousness of the danger is irrelevant. The risk spreading policy
underlying strict liability is defeated in the second case. It may be that this
policy should be defeated because of countervailing considerations;"' if so,
recovery should also have been denied in the first case.
The consumer expectation criteria for determining defectiveness was
designed to afford protection to consumers.97 This was natural since only
users or consumers could recover when the test was developed. 9s The mod-
em trend, however, is to extend the cause of action to bystanders.99 The
rationale of the consumer expectation test does not apply there.100 Bystand-
ers are frequently not in a position to protect themselves. 10 1 A user aware of
a hazard to a third party may not be as strongly motivated to protect the
third party as he would be to protect himself from similar danger. Also, the
hazard may be an impairment of the user's ability to protect third parties. 0 2
While the consumer expectation test has the virtue of being easy to
apply, its use as the sole test of "defect" involves the serious drawbacks
discussed above. As a consequence, an increasing number of courts, 0 3 in-
Mix Co., Div. of Koebring Co., 75 Wash. 2d 883, 454 P.2d 205 (1969), recog-
nizes this. Many of the cases rejecting the consumer expectation test involve
injuries to employees. See cases cited notes 103-05 infra. Another instance where
no true choice may exist is illustrated by the hepatitis-infected blood cases
discussed at notes 120-21 infra. See also James, supra note 82 at 1552-55, dis-
cussing the situation where the product is habit forming and the user discovers the
risk after he develops the habit.
96. See pt. V of this article.
97. See Dickerson, supra note 64 at 305; Noel, supra note 87 at 274; Rhein-
gold, supra note 89 at 592-93; Wade, supra note 78 at 839.
98. Noel, supra note 87 at 274.
99. E.g., Giberson v. Ford Motor Co., 504 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1974).
100. Keeton, supra note 82 at 400; Wade, supra note 78 at 884.
101. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 8d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr.
629 (1970). The case is discussed in text at note 154 infra.
102. Id.
103. Rhoads v. Service Mach. Co., 329 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Ark. 1971)
(punch press operator injured by unguarded punch press); Dorsey v. Yoder Co.,
331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), affd, 474 F.2d 1389 (3rd Cir. 1973) (opera-
tor of metal slitter injured because of inadequate safety devices); Brown v. Quick
Mix Co., Div. of Koehring Co., 75 Wash. 2d 833, 454 P.2d 205 (1969) (construc-
tion worker injured by unguarded auger of earthboring drill); Palmer v. Massey-
Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970) (farmer injured by im-
properly designed hay baler). In Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d
70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966), a farm employee was injured by the unguarded
shucking rollers of a corn picker. The court apparently rejected defendants con-
tention that there could be no liability because the danger was obvious. See also
Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co., 10 Ill. App. 3d 604, 295 N.E.2d 110 (1973), involv-
ing a punch press operator injured because the press was inadequately guarded.
While the court does not discuss the issue, the case apparently involves an obvious
danger. The cases discussed in this note and in notes 104-05 infra involve alleged
design defects, i.e., cases where the defendant would normally contend that the
pro duct is unavoidably unsafe. In such cases the plaintiff must prove negligence in
design even if he sues on a strict liability or implied warranty theory. See pt. H,
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cluding those in California 0 4 and probably New Jersey,10 5 have rejected
this test in a number of situations.
C. Cases Imposing Strict Liability for
Harm Caused by Unavoidably Unsafe Products
Although strict liability should not be applied to all cases where harm
results from an unavoidably unsafe product, 08 some courts have applied
strict liability to special situations in which its application is highly desirable.
1. Blood Cases
In Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, the Illinois Supreme
Court held a hospital strictly liable for the harm resulting from the sale of
blood infected with hepatitis virus even though it was scientifically impossi-
ble to detect the existence of the virus with present day technology. 07 Such
liability has also been imposed by the superior court of New Jersey in
Brody v. Overlook Hospital'0 8 and a Washington appellate court in Reilley
v. King County Central Blood Bank, Inc. 0 9 In addition, courts in Florida,"x0
§B of this article and notes 79 and 80 supra. However, this issue is not reached
when the danger is obvious because of the consumer expectations test. See text
accompanying notes 27-31 supra. The general rule limiting liability to hidden dan-
gers applies as fully to negligent design cases as to all other products liability cases.
Keeton, Product Liability and the Automobile, 9 Fonum 1, 11 (1973); Keeton,
Manufacturers Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and
Design of Products, 20 SyRAcus L. Rxv. 559, 572 (1969). Under this approach
feasible safety improvements need not be made as long as the danger is obvious.
See, e.g., cases cited in note 87 supra.
104. Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443
(1972) (operator of rotary mower with unguarded hole fell, injuring hand by
coming into contact with the blade); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., Cal. 8d 465,
467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970) (earthmoving machine backed over con-
struction employee); Thompson v. Package Mach. Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d 188, 99
Cal. Rptr. 281 (1971) (rim of unguarded plastic molding machine crushed
worker s hand).105. Sehipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 NJ. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965) (child
scalded by excessively hot water because "mixing valve" not installed by home-
builder). See Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972)(worker injured by unguarded punch press); Note, Torts-Products Liability-The
Manufacturer is Responsible for Installing "Feasible" Safety Devices on Unrea-
sonably Dangerous Machinery, 4 SE ON HALL L. REv. 397, 407-08 (1972).
106. See, e.g., text accompanying note 82 supra.
107. 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970). The court declared the Restate-
ment exception for unavoidably unsafe products inapplicable to products which
were impure. This is clearly wrong. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective
Products in Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. Rev. 363, 368 (1965); Note, Torts-Strict
Liability-A Hospital is Strictly Liable For Transfusions of Hepatitis-Infected Blood,
69 Micir. L. REv. 1172, 1181-82 (1971). Comment k to the Restatement expressly
applies to "new or experimental drugs as to which.., there can be no assurance
of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients."
108. 121 N.J. Super. 299, 296 A.2d 668 (1972).
109. 6 Wash. App. 172, 492 P.2d 246 (1972).
110. Community Blood Bank v. Russell, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967).
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Pennsylvania,'" and New York" 2 have left open for future consideration
the question of whether such liability should be imposed.
The New York court"2 stated that in deciding the question upon
remand:
[a]ll factors in regard to public policy must be considered and
there must be a weighing of interest between the unfortunate pa-
tients who contract the disease and the general public who are in
constant need of blood from these commercial blood banks.
The Pennsylvania case" 4 gave similar instructions to its lower court. The
New Jersey court in Brody based its decision to impose strict liability upon
an analysis of the relevant policy factors underlying the imposition of strict
liability. It found that the safety incentive rationale underlying strict lia-
bility could be advanced because: hospitals would be induced to deal with
blood banks with good safety records;"15 blood banks would be induced.
to use more care in selection of donors;"16 medical research for an effec-
tive way to detect the virus or immunize the blood recipient against it
would be encouraged; 11 and more careful use of blood would be encour-
aged.1 8 The court also recognized that the risk spreading rationale could
be advanced.119
Strict liability is highly desirable from the point of view of the donee
in such cases. He is not in a good position to bear the loss since the conse-
quences of receiving contaminated blood can be disastrous. 20 The self-
protective measures open to him are also quite limited. He may not be
aware of the risk if the information has been withheld for medical reasons.12 1
Even if he does know, he cannot minimize the risk by careful use of the
product since he cannot identify which pint of blood is contaminated. The
only protective measure open to him is to forego use of the product. If he
needs medical treatment which involves blood transfusions, he has no
effective choice.
The safety incentive policy would surely be advanced by the imposition
of strict liability. Because of price competition, the medical profession would
be encouraged to find a way to either detect the virus or to immunize the
donee. Even if this is not possible the policy would be advanced in other
111. Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp., 489 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970).
112. Carter v. Inter-Faith Hosp., 60 Misc. 2d 788, 804 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup.
Ct. 1969).
118. Id. at 787, 804 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
114. Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp., 489 Pa. 501, 507-10, 267 A.2d 867,
870-71 (1970).
115. Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 121 N.J. Super. 299, 807, 296 A.2d 668, 672
(1972).
116. Id. at 810, 296 A.2d at 674.
117. Id. at 308, 296 A.2d at 673.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a Proposal, 24
STAN. L. R.v. 489, 448 (1972).
121. Authorities cited note 52 supra.
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ways. The risk is directly related to the precautions that are taken in screen-
ing donors and handling the blood.' 22 Under negligence law the blood bank
is required only to use those precautions deemed appropriate by a reason-
able man. Strict liability induces blood banks to employ even more precau-
tions if the cost of reducing the risk by the use of those precautions is less
than the cost of potential injuries avoided by the precautions.'13
Feasibility of risk spreading, however, must also be considered from
the point of view of the industry. Blood is a product with a very high social
utility. Shifting unavoidable losses to the industry will result in higher prices.
If prices become so high that a substantial number of persons needing blood
cannot obtain it, the risk spreading might ultimately do more harm than
good.12 4
2. Polio Vaccine Cases
In Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,125 the adult plaintiff contracted
polio after taking the defendant's live virus polio vaccine. The product was
unavoidably unsafe. An adult taking the vaccine had a one in one million
chance of contracting the disease. The court stated that in such a case,
if proper warnings are given, strict liability would not be imposed. In view
of the policy considerations underlying strict liability, this may be incorrect.
Strict liability is highly desirable from the consumer's point of view because
of the disastrous consequences of the disease. The only self-protective
measure available to the consumer is abstention. 2 Risk spreading works
no undue hardship on the drug manufacturer. The number of polio cases
caused by the vaccine is predictable and quite small. By raising the price of
the vaccine sold to adults by 10 cents, the manufacturer could afford to pay
up to $100,000 in damages to each adult contracting the disease from his
vaccine. The general price increase necessary to support such an award
122. Franklin, supra note 120 at 444; Comment, Hospital's Liability for Trans-fusing Serum Hepatitis Contaminated Blood, 44 TEm,. L.Q. 575-76, 577 n.19
(1971); Note, Products Liability-Transfusions-New Jersey Applied Theory of
Strict Tort Liability to Hospitals and Blood Banks for Transfusion-Related Hepa-
titis, 4 SrTON HALL L. Rev. 730, 742-45 (1971).
123. Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for Product Design and Manu-facture, 52 TExAs L. REv. 81, 83-84 (1973).
124. The effects of risk spreading on this particular industry will probably
not be known since a vast majority of state legislatures have prohibited the
imposition of strict liability in this situation by statute. Franklin, supra note 120
at 474. These cases, however, are useful to illustrate the problems involved in the
imposition of strict liability for unavoidably unsafe products.
125. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
126. He cannot know in advance whether the disease will strike. See Dicker-
son, Products Liability: How Good Does a Product Have To Be?, 42 ]ND. L.J.
801, 315 (1967). This is undesirable. A well-informed adult would not take the
vaccine unless he were in an area where the risk of contracting the disease by
not taking the vaccine is higher than the risk posed by the vaccine. See Davis v.
Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 899 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
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would presumably be much smaller since most of the vaccine is sold to
children.127 The safety incentive rationale would also be advanced because
price competition provides a motive to develop a safer vaccine.
The California appellate courts have imposed strict liability for vaccine
induced polio in Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co.128 and Gottsdanker v.
Cutter Laboratories.129 In Gottsdanker the jury found for the defendant on
the negligence issue. In Grinnell the negligence issue was not submitted to
the jury. The cases involved live viruses in a vaccine that was supposed to be
dead. The courts did not discuss whether it was scientifically possible to
detect the virus at the time the vaccines were marketed. If this is the case,
then the vaccine is unavoidably unsafe.130 If the virus was detectable the
cases involved manufacturing defects. Perhaps the courts did not discuss the
issue because they thought it was unimportant to the decisions. In these
cases, imposing strict liability advanced underlying social policies without
creating problems serious enough to offset its advantages. This was true
whether the vaccine was unavoidably unsafe or not.
3. Other Cases
In Ver Steegh v. Flaugh, 31 the Iowa court held the seller of a breeding
hog infected with Bang's disease strictly liable for the infection resulting to
the buyers herd. The defendant argued that he could not be held liable
since it was scientifically impossible to detect the disease at the time of
sale. The court believed that the defect was discoverable but opined that
the defendant would be liable even if it was not. Assume the disease was
undiscoverable at the time of sale. The safety incentive would be advanced
by strict liability. Sellers would be willing to pay for a feasible test. Medical
research would be stimulated because of the potential profit from selling
the test. Also, there may be additional precautions that sellers can take,
such as a waiting period. The safety incentive is especially important because
of the public interest in stemming such contagious diseases. Although the
seller may be too small to spread the risk or to bear it himself in a given
case, he is no worse off than the buyer. As between two innocent parties it
is not unfair to shift the loss to the one causing it.3 2
In Hutchinson v. Revlon Corporation of California,133 a consumer suf-
fered serious skin problems resulting from the use of defendant's deodorant
under her breasts. The product had this effect because moisture from
perspiration in that area had softened the skin and destroyed one of its
127. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
128. 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969).
129. 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960).
130. See text accompanying notes 40-45 supra.
131. 251 Iowa 1011, 103 N.W.2d 718 (1960).
132. See PTOssEr, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToRTs, 492-94 (4th Ed. 1971).
133. 256 Cal. App. 2d 517, 65 Cal. Rptr. 81 (1967).
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protective elements. The product was apparently in the condition intended
by the manufacturer. The California Appellate Court held that the plaintiff
did not have to prove negligence as a basis for recovery.134 The conse-
quences were serious to the buyer, and she had no method of protecting
herself against this harm since she did not know of the risk. On the other
hand, this liability is not likely to impose an undue burden on the manu-
facturer.13r Assuming that the risk cannot be eliminated, he can still insulate
himself from strict liability in future cases by providing an appropriate
warning with the product. Such a warning gives users the ability to protect
themselves from the risk and strongly militates against the imposition of
strict liabilty13 6 Imposition of strict liability for an unknowable risk might
tend to discourage the development of new products,"37 but this may be of
minor importance with respect to products such as the ones involved in
Hutchinson.1 3 Regarding vital drugs, however, this consideration can be
important. 3 9
In Green v. American Tobacco Company,140 a jury found that the de-
fendant's cigarettes caused the plaintiffs lung cancer before the risk of
cancer from smoking was scientifically known. In answering a question
certified by the federal court handling the case 41 the Florida court held that
the scientific impossibility of discovering the risk was not a defense.142 Such
a decision provides an incentive to develop safe cigarettes. Risk spreading
is desirable here. The injury to the afflicted plaintiff is devastating. The
134. The court indicated that the result might be different if the plaintiff had
suffered an allergic reaction. It is submitted that this is incorrect. The policy
issues are the same here as in all other cases where a product causes harm. Keeton,
Products Liability-Drugs and Cosmetics, 25 VANm. L. REv. 131, 137 (1972);
Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 18 (1965). In fact,
there is better reason to impose strict liability when only a few people are injured.
Note, 55 GEO. LJ. supra note 87 at 320. See pt. IV of this article.
135. See text accompanying notes 167-70 infra.
136. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 629 (1970); Zambrana v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 26 Cal. App. 3d
209, 102 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1972).
137. Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement




140. 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
141. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962). The
court ultimately upheld a jury verdict for the defendant on the theory that ciga-
rettes were not unreasonably dangerous, i.e., marketing them is justified notwith-
standing the risk to a few smokers. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d
1166 (5th Cir. 1969). This is similar to the Restatement position regarding manu-
facturing defects.. See pt. II, §A of this article. See text accompanying notes 62-67
supra for an evaluation of this approach. The dissenting judges argued that Florida
would impose absolute liability for any harm caused by consumption of a product
meant for human use. Id. at 1166-68.
142. See Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell, 196 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1967)
(special concurring opinion).
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consumer's ability to protect himself is limited even if he knows of the risk.
The only self-protective measure available to him is abstinence. The de-
fendant's advertising and the habit-forming nature of the product makes
this doubly difficult.143 Shifting the loss to the manufacturer will force him
to raise his prices to cover the cost of the harm done by his product,144 thus
informing consumers of the true cost of the product.145 If consumption is
reduced as a consequence, it is because some smokers will have decided
that the cost of cigarettes, including the social cost, is not worth the plea-
sure. This will free resources for allocation to more desirable products.146
IV. THE Nrn FOR A DnrFim r APPROACH
TO DrE mvan=NG DEvrrmqv s
Some courts have rejected one or both of the traditional tests of
defectiveness in some situations. Yet absolute liability in all cases is
clearly impractical 47 Cases in California,'148 New Jersey, 49 Illinois,150 Flor-
ida,151 New York,152 and Washington' recognize situations where the
manufacturer should not be held liable for design improvements which were
not feasible when the product was made.
In Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co.,'1 54 the manufacturer was held liable for
negligence. A construction worker was killed when an earthmoving machine
backed over him. The operator's view to the rear was obstructed. The evi-
dence supported a finding of an unreasonable failure to equip the machine
with two rear view mirrors (which would have substantially reduced the
blind spot) and a blinking light or tooting horn to alert bystanders. Although
several California cases, discussed in the preceeding section, rejected the
negligence requirement, it is desirable in this case. Motor vehicles cause
143. This is especially true if the victim develops the habit before learning of
the risk. James, The Untoward Effects of Cigarettes and Drugs: Some Reflections
on Enterprise Liability, 54 CAL. L. PRxv. 1550, 1552, 1555 n.19 (1966).
144. Franklin, supra note 120 at 463; Katz, The Function of Tort Liability
in Technology Assessment, 38 U. Chi. L. R.v. 587, 686, 662 (1969).
145. Franklin, supra note 120 at 463.
146. Id.
147. Cases cited in note 84 supra would impose liability for unavoidably unsafe
products, but limit liability with the consumer expectations test. Its disadvantages
are discussed in pt. III, §B of this article. Cases rejecting the consumer expecta-
tions test are cited in notes 103-05 supra.
148. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal.8d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr.
629 (1970); Balido v. Improved Machinery, Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 890 (1973).
149. Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
150. Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 III. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d
749 (1972).
151. Keller v. Eagle Army-Navy Dept. Stores, Inc., 291 So. 2d 58 (Fla. App.
1974).
152. Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769 (1973).
153. Brown v. Quick Mix Co., Div. of Koehring Co., 75 Wash. 833, 454 P.2d
205 (1969).
154. 2 Cal. 3d 465,467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970).
1974]
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enormous damage.155 Shifting all such losses would undoubtedly be detri-
mental to the industry and the economy as a whole. People using such
equipment, and to some extent bystanders, can protect themselves from
properly designed vehicles by the use of due care. While strict liability
might induce some safety improvements, the possibility of improved tech-
nology rendering motor vehicles absolutely safe is simply too far off in the
future to be a consideration.
A need for some criteria to limit liability is apparent. In Gelsumino v.
E. W. Bliss Co.,56 defendant manufactured an unguarded punch press that
could be operated with a foot pedal. The plaintiff slipped while operating
the machine, put his hand in the dye, and accidentally triggered the foot
switch. Serious injuries resulted. Defendant contended that the design was
not unreasonably dangerous because it conformed to the state of the art
existing at the time of manufacture. The Illinois Appellate Court cited
Cunningham v. MacNeal1 7 for the proposition that the state of the art
defense did not apply to strict liability cases. Suppose the punch press had
fallen on the plantiff in the course of being carefully unloaded. Would the
manufacturer be liable for this harm? Would the manufacturer of a knife
be held strictly liable to everyone who is cut by the knife? True, the risk is
obvious to the user, but so was the risk in Gelsumino. Surely the plaintiff
did not need to be told to keep his hand out of the dye area while stepping
on the foot pedal.
V. DRMNC rHm Smucr LrLmmrrY IssuE
IN LGrr oF REvATr Poucy CoNsmERATnoNs
Strict tort liability was developed in the area of products liability in
order to further certain policy objectives, chiefly to spread the risk of loss
and to encourage the manufacture of safe products. These policy objectives
cannot be achieved in all cases. Countervailing considerations sometimes
make the imposition of strict liability impractical. The Restatement approach
is a compromise reached by devising one test of defectiveness to be applied
uniformly to all products. The use of this single definition makes strict lia-
bility a very crude instrument of social policy. Under this definition, the
policies underlying strict liability can be frustrated in cases where counter-
vailing considerations do not warrant its rejection. Likewise, strict liability
can be imposed in unwarranted situations despite strong countervailing
policies.' 18 Courts, as a result, have shown an increased willingness to depart
from the Restatement approach where appropriate.
155. Notes, Torts-Strict Liability-Automobile Manufacturer Liable for Defec-
tive Design that Enhanced Injury After Initial Accident, 24 VmvD. L. REv. 862,
867 (1971).
156. 10 IN. App. 3d 604, 295 N.E. 2d 110 (1973).
157. 47 IN. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970). See pt. III, §C(1) of this article.
158. See text accompanying note 175 infra.
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In deciding when to impose strict liability courts should consider, in
light of the facts of the particular case, the merits of the policies underlying
strict liability and balance these considerations against countervailing fac-
tors. Some of the factors that should be considered are as follows:
I. Risk Spreading
A. From the point of view of consumer.
1. Ability of consumer to bear loss.
2. Feasibility and effectiveness of self-protective measures.
a. Knowledge of risk.
b. Ability to control danger.
c. Feasibility of deciding against use of product.
B. From point of view of manufacturer.
1. Knowledge of risk.
2. Accuracy of prediction of losses.
3. Size of losses.
4. Availability of insurance.
5. Ability of manufacturer to self-insure.
6. Effect of increased prices on industry.
7. Public necessity for the product.
8. Deterrent effect on the development of new products.
II. Safety Incentive
A. Likelihood of future product improvement.
B. Existence of additional precautions that can presently be taken.
C. Availability of safer substitutes.
The desirability of risk spreading varies with the facts of the case. If
the consumer is able to bear the loss, risk spreading may be unnecessary.
This may be true where the product poses a risk of relatively slight harm.
But if the risk is a very serious one, like polio, most private consumers will
not be able to bear the cost.159 Commercial users, on the other hand, may
be better able to withstand serious losses than the private consumers. 10
The argument for spreading losses resulting from unavoidably unsafe
products is less compelling where the consumer can minimize the risk
through careful use of the product. Before this is possible the risk must
be known. 16' The user of a habit-forming product may discover the risk
only after he has developed the habit. 62 Even with knowledge of the risk,
ability to control the danger will vary with the circumstances. A user, for
159. Franklin, supra note 120 at 464. James, supra note 148 at 1556.
160. Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MAlY's L.J.
80, 85, 39 (1978).
161. Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 881 F.Supp. 758 (E.D.Pa. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d
1839 (3rd Cir. 1978); Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48
TExAs L. REv. 898, 400 (1970).
162. James, supra note 148.
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example, would generally have more ability than a bystander.163 For an
inherently dangerous article like a gun, the user knows that it is dangerous
and can take specific action to minimize the risk. 64 In the case of blood,
however, an informed consumer can only know that blood is sometimes
infected with hepatitis virus, and he may be compelled to take his chances. 165
To keep their jobs, employees frequently have no real choice but to use an
obviously dangerous piece of equipment.166
The desirability of risk spreading must also be considered from the
manufacturer's point of view. It has been suggested that a risk scientifically
unknown at the time of sale cannot be spread by the manufacturer since he
cannot provide for it.1o7 While knowledge of the risk is important, it is not
always controlling. Using the cigarette cancer cases as an example, even
though the risk of cancer was unknown, it was known that excessive use of
cigarettes was a significant health hazard. 68 The risk could have been pro-
vided for since it fell within the broad category of foreseeable hazards to
health.1 9 But even where the risk is unforeseeable, an inability to guard
against it has not been controlling in manufacturing defect cases.170 Un-
known hazards might be spread by subsequent price rises. This should be
possible, even in competitive industries, since the burden resulting from
strict liability is likely to be evenly distributed if all manufacturers use
due care.
Risk spreading as to known risks is easier if an accurate prediction of
losses is feasible. The sizes of the losses to be spread is another important
factor. Losses requiring substantial price increases could have an adverse
effect upon the industry if the price increases are likely to result in a reduced
demand for the product.
The ability of the industry to insure against the loss is also important.
The 1966 revision of the Standard Comprehensive General Liability Policy
excludes liability for mistakes or deficiency in design.17' If insurance be-
comes unavailable, risk spreading will force industry to self-insure through
163. See text accompanying notes 97-102 supra.
164. Dickerson, supra note 126 at 315-16.
165. Id., see text accompanying notes 120-21 supra.
166. See note 95 supra.
167. Connolly, The Liability of a Manufacturer for Unknowable Hazards
Inherent in His Product, 32 INs. C.J. 803, 307 (1965).
168. James, supra note 143 at 1557.
169. Id.
170. See pt. II, §A of this article. Design defects frequently have the potential
for causing more harm than manufacturing defects since all products made
pursuant to the design are defective. This is why risk spreading is not feasible
for all unavoidably unsafe products. But some unavoidably unsafe products cause
harm only rarely. E.g., Hutchinson v. Revlon Corp., 256 Cal. App. 2d 517, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 81 (1968), discussed at notes 133-39 supra. Likewise, some manufacturing
defects can cause great harm, e.g., a bursting dam or a nuclear accident.
171. Henderson, Insurance Protection for Products Liability and Completed
Operations-What Every Lawyer Should Know, 50 NEB. L. REv. 415, 438-39.
(1971).
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price rises. This is less feasible for small businesses than large ones. Even
if insurance is available for design defects, it may be of limited value. In
Silver Eagle Co. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.,"72 the policy
applied only to accidents occurring within the policy period and the policy
could be cancelled at any time on ten days notice. In design defect cases
the entire line is defective. When the insurance company learns the details
of the first accident and that serious future accidents are likely to occur, it
will cancel the policy. The manufacturer then pays the cost of subsequent
accidents.
The social value of the product is an important factor in risk spread-
ing.173 Risk spreading will tend to reduce the availability of the product
because increased cost will lead to increased prices. For non-essential or
undesirable products this is not especially important. But for essential prod-
ucts such as blood and drugs this factor merits careful consideration.174 In
Newmark v. Gimbe's, Inc.,"75 the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized this.
The plaintiff was harmed by a permanent wave solution applied by the
defendant's beauty parlor. The court rejected the service/sale distinction
and imposed strict liability. The court distinguished an earlier case refusing
to hold a dentist strictly liable for harm caused by a defective hypodermic
needle because such professionals are "so important to the general welfare
as to outweigh in the policy scale any need for the imposition on dentists
and doctors of the rules of strict liability in tort."1 6 Likewise the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 520 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964) provides that "the
value of the activity to the community" should be considered in determining
whether an activity is abnormally dangerous and thus subject to strict
liability. Such factors are equally relevant in the products liability area.
A closely related consideration is the tendency of strict liability to dis-
courage the development of new products."7 The law of negligence was
designed to encourage development of emerging industries."78 This rationale
still applies to new products and new industries being developed today.
For example, the development of nuclear energy sources appears to be a
feasible alternative to the world's impending energy shortage. Present tech-
nology is such that this activity presents great risk."79 A company contem-
plating development and sale of nuclear reactors might well be deterred
172. 246 Ore. 398, 423 P.2d 944 (1967).
173. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825,
844 (1978).
174. Keeton, note 137 supra; Traynor, The Ways and Meanings. of Defective
Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 369 (1965).
175. 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969).
176. Id. at 597, 258 A.2d at 703.
177. Connolly, supra note 167 at 306; Dickerson, supra note 126 at 324;
Keeton, Manufacturing Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture
and Design of Products, 20 SyrAcusE L. REv. 559, 571 (1969).
178. Malone, note 1 supra.
179. Dooley, Nuclear Energy-An Evaluation from the Viewpoint of the Public
Weal, ABA SECTON INS., NEc., AN CoMp. LAw, 1971 PRocEEDINGS 272.
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from entering this business by the prospect of strict liability. The potential
harm caused by such a device is so great as to threaten bankruptcy to
virtually any company.8 0 Therefore, in the absence of governmental insur-
ance, strict liability in such cases is undesirable. A rule that takes such
factors into account will not impede the development of new products. A
drug manufacturer contemplating the introduction of an apparently desir-
able drug will know that the value of his industry will be taken into account
in making the strict liability decision. Only losses that turn out in retrospect
to be practical for him to pass on to the public through price rises will be
shifted.
Whether the safety incentive rationale underlying strict liability can be
advanced also varies depending on the case. Where the prospects of product
improvement are sufficiently favorable to warrant additional research, strict
liability is indicated.18' The blood cases discussed previously 82 are a possi-
ble example. Even if there is no such prospect, the safety rationale can be
advanced if additional desirable safety precautions not required by the law
of negligence are available. Here again, the blood cases serve as an
example. 8 3
This approach to strict liability will yield superior results. It is no more
difficult to apply than many other rules. Results will be less predictable
than when a single test of "defect" is applied to all cases. However, this is
outweighed by its advantages. In fact, its use would enhance predictability
in those jurisdictions abandoning the traditional approach in selected cases
without establishing new criteria.
180. Id. at 275.
181. Katz, supra note 144 at 636.
182. See pt. III, §G of this article.
183. See pt. III, §C of this article.
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